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When the Reverend Al Sharpton formally launched hi s bid to secure the 
Democratic Par ty's 2004 presidential nornination, the black Pentecostal 
mi ni ster from New York was already a familiar figure. He first attracted 
widespread attention when - in 1987 - he spearheaded efforts to secure 
legal redress for Tawana Brawley, a black teenager who claimed that she 
had been raped by a white gang. Four years later, he was accused of 
encouraging riots in Crown Heights. There were claims of anti-Semitism. 
Although he had admirers, Sharpton's appearance and evident vanity 
encouraged derision, particularly among whites. 
However, despi te the early controversies, and although he continued to 
lead protests against police actions and US military bombing tr ials on the 
Puerto Rican island of Vieques, Sharpton moderated his image as the 
1990s progressed. In 1992 and J 994, he joined the Democratic Senatorial 
primary contests and, in the latter race, seemed 80 per cent of the black 
vote and 25 per cent of the total vote. In 1997, he was a candidate for 
New York City mayor. The search for a degree of respectability yielded 
political dividends and by the end of the 1990s, he was widely regarded 
as an influential power broker. Those seeking to run on the Democratic 
ticket and some Republicans sought his backing. In 2000, meetings were 
held with Hillary Clinton as well as presidential contenders, Bill Bradley 
and Al Gore. Sharpton himself talked increasingly of peacefu l protest 
rather than confrontation. Indeed, he was hailed by Coretta Scott King as 
36 American Studies in Scandinavia, Vol. 36:2, 2004 
"a leader who has protested injustice with a passionate unrelenting com-
mitment to nonviolent action in the spirit and tradition of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr."1 
Sharpton and the Jackson Campaigns 
Initially, Sharpton's presidential campaign seemed to talk in tern1s that 
recalled Jesse Jackson's bids to secure the Democratic presidential nomi-
nation in both 1984 and 1988. Although Jackson lost out to former Vice-
President Walter Mondale and Governor Michael Dukakis respectively, 
his 1988 bid not only galvanized the black vote and increased voter reg-
istration levels, but also captured significant levels of backing in states 
where there were relatively few African American voters.2 In all , Jackson 
attracted 3.5 and seven million votes in 1984 and 1988 respectively. Fur-
thermore, at the end of the 1988 primary season, Jackson's national con-
vention speech - which was widely regarded as electrifying - was a left 
populist rallying cry for a broadly-based "rainbow coalition" that might 
secure an arms freeze, radical reform based upon an extension of govern-
ment provision, and a more egalitarian nation. 
For his part, Sharpton also spoke of building a broad coalition. He told 
supporters that his campaign would be "anti-war, anti-death penalty, anti-
tax cut across the board."3 It would "reach out to disaffected voters, 
including Latinos, blacks, gays and lesbians, and young people."4 The 
campaign was also committed to increasing voter registration, securing 
the voting rights of citizens living in Washington, DC - who lack full rep-
resentation in Congress - and ensuring that "women's rights are not 
stolen from them by the Republican Right." In particular, there was a 
commitment to "universal health care for the nation" and equal educa-
tional opportuni ties. Both would - Sharpton 's platform asserted - be 
guaranteed through amendments to the US Constitution.5 
I. CBS.com, 60 M i11111es - 71ie Power Bmker, 19 April 2000. 
www.cbsnews.com/scories/2000/04/ 17 /60Wmain 185252.shcml. 
2. Manning Marable, Uoce, Uehellian and Reform: 711e Second Black Ueco11srmc1io11 in IJ/ack America, 
1945-1990 (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1991) 2 16. 
3. Associated Press, "Al Sharpton Joins the Race for Presidem," ABCNew ... com , 21 January 2004. 
4. Tl1e New York Times, 14 February 2004. 
5 . Al Sharpton- Prcsitknt: www.sharpton2004.org/. 
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Few observers suggested that Sharpton had a serious prospect of win-
ning the nomination. Nonetheless, there were hopes that his campaign 
could tilt the center of political gravity within lhe Democratic Party away 
from Clintonesque centrism. For his part, C larence Page of The Chicago 
Tribune compared Sharpton with Ralph Nader, the 2000 Green candi-
date: "We still have a role in our socie ty for the gadfly or agitator . .. They 
still have a role in giving voice to the voiceless."6 The time was also 
right, it was said, to raise populist issues and address the economic gulf 
between working Americans and the wealthy. The New York Times 
reported that Sharpton planned to go beyond the campaign platform and 
structure the campaign around Enron and its ties with the Bush adrnini s-
t:ration. At the least, it was said, the Sharpton campaign would add to the 
number of registered voters and establish Sharpton himself as the US's 
principal civil rights leader. As The Chicago Tribune suggested in an 
otherwise hostile commentary: 
Rev Al Sharpton fcan] no longer be dismissed as merely a loudmouth New York pariah. 
Today, his home state politicians seek his endorsement . .. With no chance of winning 
the nomination, a well-executed Sharpton campaign could secure his place in the civil 
rights pantheon and the national Democratic Party.7 
However, in the months that followed, Sharpton 's campaign did little to 
fulfil this early promise. While there were forecasts that he might win the 
South Carolina (where blacks comprised 47 per cent of the voters) and 
Washington, DC primaries, and later suggestions in The Black Conunen-
tator that he had shifted the tem1s of the pre-nomination debate by com-
pelling the other contenders to emphasize the value that they placed upon 
African American voters, his campaign failed to make a significant impact. 
He only attracted 20 per cent of the vote in the District of Columbia, l 0 per 
cent in South Carolina, and 8 per cent in New York. Furthermore, the result 
in many other states was less than 5 per cent and often listed as 0 per cent. 
Instead, Senator John Kerry won much of the black vote. Indeed, Ken-y 
gained higher levels of support among African Americans and other non-
white groupings than whites. Bereft of support among blacks, Sharpton 
had no prospect whatsoever of constructing a broader coalition. 
6. Quoted in Seth Gitcll, "A l Sharpton for President?" 22 July 2004, '/1te P/ioe11ix.(·0111 , 
w1vw.bostonphoenix.com/boston/news_features/top/features/documents/02 I 79035.ht1n. 
7. Ellen Warren, "Al Sharpton : Re inventing Himself," The Chicago 'frihu11e 20 November 2003. 
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John Edwards John Kerry Al Sharpton 
White Men ( 43 % ) 52% 58% 2% 
White Women (46%) 52% 64% 1% 
Non-White Men (5%) 32% 47% 20% 
Non-White Women (6%) 41 % 54% 14% 
Table 1: Percentage of the South Carolina Democratic primary electorate supporting Sen-
ator John Edwards, Senator John Kerry and Al Sharpton (2004)" 
Despite the proportionality of the system by which the Democrats allo-
cate national convention delegates following the primaries and caucuses, 
Sharpton had amassed - by mid-March - just 27 delegates compared 
with the 2,162 who were pledged to the front-runner, Senator John Kerry. 
At this point, while remaining in the contest, Sharpton endorsed Kerry. 
As he told the Associated Press, it was "fu tile" to continue the campaign. 
The contrast between the Sharpton and Jackson campaigns could 
hardly be more pronounced. In 1984, Jackson secured 72 per cent of the 
black vote while 92 per cent of black voters supported him in 1988. 
Although much of the energy and enthusiasm that Jackson marshaled 
was later dissipated, Jackson established himself as an important political 
figure and the rise in black voter registration as a consequence of his 
campaigning contributed to a significant increase in the number of 
elected black officials. Two figures closely associated with the Jackson 
campaigns - Alexis Herman and Ron Brown - were later offered cabinet 
posts in the Clinton administration.9 
Reasons 
Why did the Sharpton campaign fail so dramatically? Why was it unable 
to recapture the elan and energy of the Jackson campaigns? A partial 
answer lies in the changing character of the primary process. The period 
during which the primaries and caucuses are held has been increasingly 
8. Source: adapted from CNN.com, America \0tes 2004: "/1ie Primaries 
www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/primaries/pages/epolls/SC. 
9. DcWayne Wickham, "Sharpton's Campaign Disappoints," USA Today, 2 March 2004, 
www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/columnist/wickham/2004-03-02-wickham_x.htm 
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compressed. To be successful in a "front-loaded" system, candidates 
must have the resources to campaign in a number of different states at the 
same time. Relative outsiders can no longer look for a win in states such 
as Iowa and New Hampshire and then - on the basis of momentum that 
they have created - attract the funding required to campaign in other 
states during the following months. 
Al Sharpton 's low initial ratings were also a factor. Despite the shift in 
the character of Sharpton's image during the 1990s, white opinion 
remained overwhelmingly hostile and black attitudes towards him were 
mixed. According to a survey conducted in 2000, 37 per cent of Afri can 
Americans saw him in positive terms (compared with just 10 per cent 
among the general population) but 29 per cent regarded him unfavorably. 10 
A third explanation lies in the broader political context. Faced by a 
Republican hold on both chambers of Congress and the White House, 
there was a desperation to win . It was this that also damned former Ver-
mont Governor Howard Dean 's bid for the presidency. Ron Walters of 
the University of Maryland has alluded to this in his comments on the 
Sharpton campaign: "If there wasn ' t this tremendous sense of urgency . . . 
he would have been given more consideration. There is little flexibility in 
this atmosphere." 11 
Thirdly, the campaign lacked a mobilizing network. Sharpton was very 
much associated with New York and - despi te the claims made for the 
National Action Network (NAN) - his links with other parts of the 
country were often tenuous. ln short, there were few grassroots activists. 
In 1984 and 1988, many black elected officials were ambivalent towards 
Jackson. However, hi s campaigns were able to draw upon the barely 
veiled efforts of the black clergy. In 2004, few ministers offered a plat-
form to Sharpton or encouraged voter registration on hi s behalf. 
Fourthly, the character of the Sharpton campaign compounded the other 
difficulties. It was marked - all observers agreed - by significant organi-
zational difficulties. Appointments were not kept and meetings failed to 
take place. Frequently he failed to appear at scheduled events. There were 
also financial problems. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) fined 
10. David A. Bositis, National Opinion Poll - Politics (Washington, DC: Joim Cemcr for Political and 
Econo mic Studies, 2000) 18. 
11. Carla Thompson, "Sharpton's Tactics Responsible for Black Vmcrs' Snub," 18 February 2004, 
www.blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx/bawnews/sharptoncactics. 
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Sharpton $5,500 in February for filing late disclosure reports. In May, in a 
unanimous FEC ruling, he was asked to repay $100,000 after claims that 
he had exceeded a $50,000 limit that candidates may spend on their own 
campaigns . Furthermore, Sharpton's loyalty to the Democrats was also in 
doubt. At least one Republican Party operative was involved in the 
Sharpton campaign. From the right's point of view, the campaign offered 
an opportunity to fuel tensions among Democrats and attach an extremist 
label to the Democrats . As New York's Village Voice reported, a Repub-
lican activist who had played a critical role in hindering the Florida 
recounts in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election, organized 
Sharpton's application for matching funds from the Federal Election 
Commission and also appointed some staff members to the campaign. 12 
However, a much more profound and far-reaching explanation has also 
been put forward. Writing in The Atlantic, Mark Bowden has argued that 
the failure of the Sharpton campaign to make significant headway reflects 
a fundamental shift in the character of black politics over the past two 
decades. From thi s perspective, Sharpton's repudiation by black voters 
suggests that there is a process of absorption into the American main-
stream. African American politics, it is said, have matured and moved 
beyond anachronistic appeals based upon race. Whereas black voters were 
once marshaled behind calls for racial justice and redistributive policies, 
this form of political exceptionalism is now on the wane. From this per-
spective, Sharpton 's failure is a step along the road to "modernization" and 
"normalized" two-party politics. Increasingly, black attitudes are - like 
white opinion - shaped by mainstream political issues such as terrorism, 
the Iraq war and economy. Similarly, Aftican American voters are - like 
white voters - pulled between the ideas associated with conservatism and 
moderate liberalism. In short: "civil-rights progress has desirnplified black 
politics. African American voters no longer come in one flavour." 11 
Bowden suggests that the shift has four principal components. He 
points, firstly, to the decline of the "Negro spokesman." In past years, 
African Americans and whites looked towards an acknowledged leader or 
a small group ofleaders at both local and national level. Figures such as 
12. Wayne Barren with special reporting by Adam Hutton and Christine Lagorio. "Sleeping with the GOP: 
A Bush Covert Operati ve Takes over Al Sharpton's Campaign," 5 February 2004, 
http: //villagevoice.com/issucs/0405/barrett.php. 
13. Mark Bowden, "Pompadour with a Monkey Wrench," 711e Atlantic 294.1 (July-August 2004): 95. 
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Frederick Douglass, Martin Luther King and, in some respects, Jesse 
Jackson played this rol e. lt is - he argues - a sign of political maturity that 
although he has failed to grasp this, there is no longer a role for Sharpton 
to assume. Secondly, a "strong black middle class" has emerged. Thirdly, 
on the basis of this, there has been an overall decline in levels of identifi-
cation with the Democratic Party among African Americans. Although 
African Americans remain the party's most loyal consti tuency, there was, 
Bowden records, a fall in the proportion of those identifying themselves as 
Democrats from 74 per cent in 2000 to 63 per cent in 2002. His figures are 
drawn from a poll conducted by the Joint Center for Political and Eco-
nomic Studies (JCPES). 14 Fourthly, Bowden suggests, there is now much 
greater political diversity among those African Americans who have 
secured positions of influence. The rise of figures such as Clarence 
Thomas, who made common cause with Antonin Scalia so as to form a 
"hard right" faction on the US Supreme Court bench, and the prominence 
of other blacks - most notably National Secmity Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice and Colin Powell - in the Bush administration are testimony to this. 
Lastly, African Americans "are way past the point where they think they 
will further their agenda just by voting for someone black."15 
Partisanship 
Bowden's conclusions are, however, tinged with a degree of wishful 
thinking. Although the JCPES study recorded a fall in black partisan 
identification between 2000 and 2002, other surveys covering the period 
draw radically different conclusions. The University of Michigan's 
National Election Studies (NES) found that if all forms of black Demo-
cratic partisanship - from "leaners" to those most strongly committed -
are considered, there was a rise in partisan identification from 83 per cent 
to 85 per cent during these years. 16 
14. David A. Bosi lis, 2002 Nario11al Opi11io11 Pull: Pulilics (Washington, DC: Joint Cenler for Political 
and Economic Studies. 2002) 5 . 
15. Mal Johnson, quoted in Bowden 95. 
16. National Election Studies (2004) The NHS Guide ro P11blic Opinion and Elecrora/ /Jehavior -Parry 
Jde11rificario11 3-Poinr Scale 1952-2002 (2004), www.umich.edu/-nes/nesguide/2nd1able/12a_2_ 1.htm. 
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However, even if the notion of a decline between 2000 and 2002 was 
to be accepted, it would be a mistake to draw firm conclusions from this 
or talk of a di scernible long-term fall in levels of identification with the 
Democratic Party. All polling surveys record short-term changes and 
shifts. These may be trendless fluctuations or a consequence of polling 
error. However, there is some evidence that they are associated with the 
overall political climate. There was a marked rise in black Democratic 
partisanship in the early 1990s as the Republican right campaigned 
against the Clinton White House and subsequently won control over both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate and again during the 
impeachment drama of the late 1990s. During both periods, African 
American opinion rallied to Clinton. Furthermore, if the NES polling fig-
ures are used, black Democratic partisanship remained at a high level 
between 2000 and 2002. Allegations that black voters had been disen-
franchised in Florida and perceptions of the Bush administration may 
well have fuelled Democratic loyalties that were sustained despite the 
impact of the September 11 attacks. 
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Whites 39 47 45 42 47 45 44 42 
Blacks 80 79 77 81 78 84 83 85 
Table 2: Percentages of strong Democratic identifiers - by race (1988-2002) 17 
Opinion 
The claim that black attachment to the Democratic Party is breaking 
down and that African Americans are increasingly open to two-party 
competition is not original. Indeed, it has been put forward in different 
forms since the civil rights years of the 1950s and 1960s. The late Lee 
Atwater, who served as Republican Party Chairman under President 
George H. W. Bush, spoke of the Party winning a 20 per cent share of the 
black vote. There were outreach activities throughout the 1990s and 
17. Source: adapted fro111 National Election Studies, The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Elecrora/ 
Behavior - Party /de11tificatio11 3-Point Scale 1952-2002, 2004, 
www.umich.edu/- nes/ nesgui<le/2ndtable/t2a_2_1.htm. 
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repeated talk of a breaktlu·ough. Yet, in 2000, George W. Bush attracted 
just 8 per cent of the black vote, the lowest figure since Senator Bany 
Goldwater stood as the Party 's presidential candidate in 1964. 
Why is black opinion so resistant to Republican overtures? In part, it is 
because the party's efforts have been limited in character. Indeed, some 
observers suggest that they have been directed more towards reassuring 
moderate white opinion. However, there are also other reasons. Firstly, 
many blacks and whites have strikingly different attitudes to the role of 
government, particularly the federal government in Washington, DC. For 
many African Americans, the federal government played a critical role, 
albeit in a hesitant and uneven way, in the civil rights revolution. The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and - most notably - President Lyndon 
Johnson imposed reform upon southern officials who had pledged them-
selves to "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." 
ln contrast, for many whites, the federal government instead became 
increasingly synonymous with a burgeoning bureaucracy, tax increases, 
and excessive regulation. In 2000, 41 per cent of whites told pollsters that 
the federal government was "too powerful. " Only 19 per cent of African 
Americans agreed. 18 
Secondly, while there are many shared concerns, there are also differ-
ences between blacks and whites in terms of policy preferences. Issues 
associated with the Democrats such as unemployment, poverty, and edu-
cation often have a higher priority for African Americans than whites. 
Furthermore, although much depends upon the way in which polling 
questions are posed and the issue has fluctuated in terms of its relative 
salience, many blacks and whites see affirmative action in different ways. 
While some familiar Republican figures - most notably Secretary of 
State Colin Powell - have endorsed affirmative action in, at least, a lim-
ited form, and the Bush administration maintain a degree of skillfully 
crafted ambiguity in - for example - the amicus curiae brief it submitted 
when the University of Michigan's admission policies were considered 
by the US Supreme Court in 2003, the Republicans are - as a party - pop-
ularly associated with opposition to such programs. Affirmative action is, 
however, backed by most African Americans. 
I 8. National Election Studies (2004), The NES Guide to Public 01'i11io11 a11d Electoral Behavior - Power 
of1/1e Federal Guvem 111e11t, www.umich.edu/-nes/nesgui<lc/2n<ltable/t4a_ I_2.hlm. 
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Favor Oppose No opinion 
Non-Hispanic Whites 44 49 7 
Blacks 70 21 9 
Table 3: Attitudes towards affirmative action - by race (2003)19 
At the same time, there is still a belief that the Republican Party harbors 
old prejudices. These suspicions were intensified when - in December 
2002 - Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott told those gathered at a 
birthday party for Strom Thurmond, who sought the presidency in 1948 
on a "Dixiecrat" segregationist platform, that he wished that Thurmond 
had won.20 
Thirdly, despite Mark Bowden's stress on the rise of a "strong black 
middle class" and the boom of the late 1990s, many African Americans 
remain economically vulnerable. Large numbers are confined to the sec-
ondary labor market. Jobs are characteristically poorly-paid, insecure, 
governed by arbitrary procedures and norms, and offer few opportunities 
for advancement. Disproportionate numbers of African Americans lag 
behind in terms of both education and income. Furthermore, there is a 
significant degree of dependence upon public sector employment and 
provision. The higher echelons of the private corporation are still largely 
white in character. 
There is, fourthly, still a deep sense of separation in the black commu-
nities. The degree of separation - and the contrast between blacks and 
other racial and ethnic groupings was highlighted in a Zogby poll con-
ducted between December 1999 and February 2000 - looked at different 
ethnic and racial groupings. It suggested that African Americans - and to 
a lesser extent other groups - were still spatially and socially separated. 
Arguably, this leads to feelings of detachment from the political estab-
lishment represented - in its more visible and self-confident form - by 
the Republicans . 
19. Question text: "Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for racial rninoritic,?" 
Source: adapted from USA Today, "Gallup Poll Results," 23 June 2003 , 
www.usatoday.com/ncws/pollsltablesllive/0623.hlm. 
20. Edward Ashbee, "The Lott Resignation, 'Blogging,' and American Conservatism," The Po/i1ical 
Quanerly 74.3 (July-September 2003): 361-70. 
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African Hispanic Asian Arab Jewish Italian 
Do not have close 
friendships with 
other ethnic groups 18.5 2 1.0 14.0 7.5 9.5 2.5 
Neighborhood is 
predominantly 
composed of the 
same ethnic group 33.5 21.0 8.5 5.5 13.0 5.0 
Table 4: Ethn ic and raci al groupings - selected c haracteristics ( 1999-2000)21 
Separation is tied to notions of group allegiance and a commitment to 
"descriptive representation." Surveys suggest that there are significantly 
higher levels of backing for a member of Congress by African American 
constituents if she or he is black. According to Katherine Tate's 2003 
study, 60 per cent backed their legislator 's performance when she or he 
was a black Democrat compared with just 36 per cent for a white Demo-
crat.22 The failure of the Republicans to recruit and stand significant num-
bers of black candidates creates a further bond between African Ameri-
cans and the Democrats. 
We Are All Multiculturalists Now 
There has been a recognition of black "exceptionalism" on the conserva-
tive right as well as the left. In 1963, Nathan Glazer - a celebrated com-
mentator and a founding father of neoconservatism - published Beyond 
the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of 
New York City with Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Glazer and Moynihan 
argued that each ethnic and racial group had found - or would find - its 
own route to success, gro up pluralism, and integration. The civil rights 
revolution would allow blacks to follow the course set by the Irish, Poles 
and other immigrant groupings. However, as the decades progressed, 
Glazer's reservations have taken an increasingly rigorous and - from hi s 
perspective - pessimistic form. 
21. So urce: adapted fro m James J. Zogby, Whal £ 1/mic Americans Really Think (Zogby International, 
200 1), 1\1bles 25, 26, 27, 44 and 45. 
22. Huey L. Perry, "Race, the State, and Research Scholar.,;hip on Race and PoUtics," The Jormw/ of Poli-
Jics 66.3 (August 2004): 960. 
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[n his 1998 book, We Are All Multiculturalists Now, Glazer argues that 
whereas Latinos and Asian-Americans may well become less economi-
cally, culturally and politically distinct, the prospects for the integration of 
African Americans into the American mainstream are much less certain: 
The two nations for our Ame1ica are the black and the white, and increasingly, as 
Hispa11ics and Asians become less different from whites from the point of view of resi-
dence, income, occupation, and political attitudes, the two nations become the black 
and the others ... Only twenty years ago we could still believe that African Americans 
would become, in their ways of life, their degree of success, their conneclion to society, 
simply Americans of darker skin ... But our progress in moving toward that goal, wh ile 
evident in some respects, show some serious backsliding, and more than that, a hard 
institutional ization of differences.23 
Shifts and changes 
Nonetheless, although the "moderni zation" thesis is an overstatement, it 
would be a mistake to assert that black politics have remained static over 
the past two decades. There has been a shift and this provides a further -
perhaps decisive - reason for the failure of the Sharpton campaign. l n par-
ticular, polling reports have suggested that black attitudes are losing the 
radical edge that provided a basis for Jackson 1984 and 1988 campaigns. 
If attitudes towards discrimination are considered, there has been a 
marked fall in the proportion of African Americans asserting that the 
failure of blacks to match whites in terms of socio-economic status was 
due to discrimination. 
1986 1990 1994 1998 2000 
Blacks 74.4 83.6 80.8 62.8 64.8 
Whites 40.3 36.7 36.0 3 1.9 33.4 
Table 5: Importance of discrimination, 1986-2000 - percentage of who responded that 
SES differences were "due to d iscrimination" - by race ( 1986-2000)24 
23. Nathan Glazer, We Are All M11/tic11/111ra/is ts Now (Camhridgc: Harvard University Press, 1998) 149. 
24. Question text: "On the average (Blacks/Afri can Americans) have worse jobs, income, and housing 
than white people. Do you think these differences arc ... mainly due to discrimination?" Source: adapted from 
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Alongside this, although disproportionate numbers of blacks still see 
the federal government in far more positive terms than whites and there 
have been short-term fluctuations, most notably reactions to the Nixon 
administration, Vietnam and Watergate, there has been a significant rise 
in the proportion of African Americans who - like many whites - see the 
federal government as over-powerful. 
1964 1966 1970 1972 "1984 1992 2000 
Blacks 5 13 14 3 1 18 25 19 
._. 
Whites 33 42 33 42 35 44 41 
Table 6: Power of lhe federal government 1964-2000 - percentage who responded "gov-
ernment too powerful" - by race (1964-2000)25 
Similarly, fewer African Americans look towards government provision. 
Instead, there is - by implication - more of an emphasis on self-reliance 
and individual effort. 
1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 
Blacks 54 50 44 41 30 
--- --
-
Whites 25 18 22 20 21 
Table 7: Federal government provision of jobs and a standard of living - percentage who 
responded "government to see to jobs and a standard of living" (1-3 on a seven point 
scale) - by race ( 1984-2000)26 
In part, all of this is part of a broader process . The center of political 
gravity has swung ri ghtwards across much of the globe since the 1980s. 
However, although there is still a perceptual gulf between blacks and 
The National Opinion Research Center. General Social S111v<'y Codebook - RACIJ/F/ (2004). 
http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/GSS/. 
25. Ques1ion tex1: '"What is your fee ling, do you think the government is gening 100 1>0werful or do you 
think the government is nol gelling too sLrong?" Source: adapted from adapted from National Election Stu-
dies, The Nt.'S Guide 10 Public Opinion and Electoral /Jehavior - Poll'er of 1/ie Federal Govem111e111 (2004). 
www.umich.edu/-ncs/ncsguidc/2ndtablc/t4a_ I _2 .htm. 
26. Question text: "Some people fee l that the government in Washington should see to it that every person 
has a job and a good standard of living ... Others think the government shOL1ld just let cach person get ahcatl 
on his/ their own . Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven' t you thought much about this'1" (7-
point scale shown to respondent). Source: adapted from National Election Studies, The NES Guide 1n Puh/ic 
Opinion and /Olec1nml /Jehavior (2004), www.umich.edu/- ncs/ncsguide/2ndtable/t4a_ 4b_ I .htm. 
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whites, black opinion has shifted at a faster pace than that of whites. In 
part, thj s may be attributable to the close character of Bill Clinton's rela-
tionship with African Americans. Despite his disavowal of radicalism -
or even Democratic tradi tionali sm - and his backing for measures such as 
welfare reform, Clinton's backing from black voters reached record 
levels, particularly during the closing months of his administration. How-
ever, the commercial redevelopment of black neighborhoods such as 
Harlem and their absorption into the broader urban economy may also 
have played a part by undermining calls for radical economic change. At 
the same time, the failure of activists to build sustained forms of organi-
zation from either the Jackson campaigns or initiatives such as the 1995 
Million Man March also contributed to the shift. 
While African Americans will continue to remajn wedded to the 
Democratic Party and Republican outreach efforts will almost certainly 
prove fruitless, there is now much less of a basis for campaigns - such as 
that mounted by Al Sharpton - that rest upon calls for expanded govern-
ment provision and a redistribution of income and wealth. Sharpton's 
address to the Democrats' July 2004 national convention was hailed as a 
gripping and largely spontaneous performance in an otherwise orches-
trated week. However, despite the plaudits, Sharpton 's words remained 
just rhetoric and his hyperbole served as a reminder of his detachment 
from the contemporary American political process. 
